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Abstract This paper addresses the problem of upgrading functional infor-
mation to knowledge. Functional information is defined as syntactically well-
formed, meaningful and collectively opaque data. Its use in the formal episte-
mology of information theories is crucial to solve the debate on the veridical
nature of information, and it represents the companion notion to standard
strongly semantic information, defined as well-formed, meaningful and true
data. The formal framework, on which the definitions are based, uses a con-
textual version of the verificationist principle of truth in order to connect
functional to semantic information, avoiding Gettierization and decoupling
from true informational contents. The upgrade operation from functional in-
formation uses the machinery of epistemic modalities in order to add data
localization and accessibility as its main properties. We show in this way the
conceptual worthiness of this notion for issues in contemporary epistemology
debates, such as the explanation of knowledge process acquisition from infor-
mation retrieval systems, and open data repositories.
Keywords Epistemic Modalities · Functional Information · Upgrade.
1 Introduction
The recent debate on the epistemology of the notion of information and the
widely discussed disagreement concerning its veridical nature, was ignited by
the following definition:1:
DEF Semantic information is well-formed, meaningful and veridical data.
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1 The definition was first given in [Floridi, 2004], republished as [Floridi, 2011, Chapter
2].
2The resulting different approaches towards DEF can be reduced – at least
partially – to the following most fundamental question: what is the difference
between information and knowledge?2
[Floridi, 2005] has replied to this question by maintaining that semantic
and alethically neutral data provides only necessary but insufficient condi-
tions for information: a pile of syntactical data which proves to be false or
meaningless, cannot be accounted for information and, in the best case, re-
duces to misinformation (significant but untrue data). The task is completed
by a formal logic that satisfies this notion of information. The logic for being
informed, introduced in [Floridi, 2006],3 provides the formal analysis of a cog-
nitive statal state Iap of an agent a holding the information that p, where I
is formalized as a veridical but neither introspective nor reflective necessity
operator. This makes information logically distinct from knowledge: its logic
requires the axioms of normal modal logic B, thus making it distinct from the
KT,S4,S5 epistemic logics. On the other extreme of the epistemic spectrum,
this differentiates the logic of being informed from the KD,KD4,KD45 dox-
astic logics. In [Allo, 2010], a number of issues with respect to this approach
to modelling information have been raised and a revision proposed in view of
a pure and an applied semantics for it.
Besides the purely logical solution of adding the required axioms, the dis-
tinction between information and knowledge is completed by resolving one
more problem: knowledge encapsulates semantic information, but how to go
from the state of being informed to knowing, i.e. how to upgrade? The an-
swer to this question is given in [Floridi, 2010],4 where the semantic theory
of information satisfying the veridicality thesis given by DEF is embedded
in a Network Theory of Account (NTA), which explains the basic epistemic
process transforming information into knowledge contents. Briefly explained,
according to the process of accounting embedded into the NTA, an instance of
information p can be upgraded to knowledge by connecting p to the conceptual
network of interrelations to which it belongs. Such a network is constituted by
the information that can give reasons in supporting p, that is, the information
that explains the reasons why p is the case. Floridi considers such information
to be the answer to what he calls ‘how come’ questions (HC-questions): any
standalone instance of information poses a set of HC-questions concerning the
path of events that generated the scenario described by p (genealogical HC-
questions), the mechanism or the way in which the scenario described in p
was determined (functional HC-questions), and the purpose to which the sce-
nario described in p is devoted (teleological HC-questions). The information
conveyed by the answers to such questions provides the explanation for p.
2 It will appear clearly from the next few lines in this introduction that this problem
has a complementary question: what is the difference between information and belief? Both
questions account for the role of information theories and philosophy of information in the
traditional debates in formal epistemology, but only the former will be tackled here.
3 This article was republished as [Floridi, 2011, Chapter 10].
4 Republished as [Floridi, 2011, Chapter 12].
3For many of its defenders (as e.g. Grice and Dretske), the veridicality the-
sis seems to endure a classical (corrispondentist) theory of truth. Nonetheless,
DEF and NTA leave completely open the possibility of understanding truth
in terms of redundancy or coherence and, in particular, Floridi defends a cor-
rectness theory of truth.5 At any rate, a basic assumption is that when con-
sidering these two conceptual pillars of a theory of information, we are talking
about a notion of factual information, i.e. data working as constraining af-
fordances, typed at a certain level of abstraction that generate the interface
at which information is accessed and processed. This notion of information
endorses truthfulness. A large disagreement concerns this latter point, also
called Veridicality Thesis (VT).6 This controversy can be solved by agreeing
that analyses allowing possibly false informational contents refer to a concep-
tually distinct notion of information. The role of factual information as main
notion to be focused on in the information sciences is sided by the comple-
mentary notion of instructional or functional information. This distinction has
been endorsed in [Floridi, 2009].7 Functional information is not the descrip-
tive content of a fact or state of affairs. Its role is instructional, in that it
seeks, or otherwise instructs to bring about a state of affairs and it expresses
the conditional state of the factual notion of information: it contains the in-
structions which, when executed, realize factual information. At this level, the
non-veridical nature of information is required: it is the sort of data that, when
and if executed, will transform a semantic content from false to true (turning
a content of misinformation into a piece of semantic information). The execu-
tion of the instruction carried by functional information performs the task of
actualizing data. This act is data-typology dependent: executing an instruc-
tion related to empirical data concerns an act of instantiation; executing an
instruction related to logical data requires an act of verification.
In the following, we shall support the thesis that a further property is re-
quired to identify correctly functional information, namely localization: we will
defend a view according to which functional information is expressed in terms
of data asserting locally executable sets of instructions; locality is expressed
by linking validity to a set of sources. The factual counterpart is identified
as the truthful content of globally executed instructions.8 The present notion
of functional information as realizable instructions requires non-actual data
in the sense of (locally) executables, in turn making the factual counterpart
be expressed by actual data, in the sense of (globally) executed instructions.
From this reading is evident that we are endorsing an epistemic reading of
the notion of information, which characterizes factual information as mean-
ing, whereas realizable instructions bear a strong connections to predicable
contents. This distinction between the meaningfulness of data for functional
5 See [Floridi, 2010b], now republished as [Floridi, 2011, Chapter 8].
6 See [Colburn, 2000], [Fetzer, 2004], [Dodig-Crnkovic, 2005].
7 See also [Floridi, 2010c].
8 Notice that we entirely endorse here the distinction from the Semantic Theory of In-
formation between Data and Information, where the former are intended as vehicles of the
latter, deprived of meaning.
4information and the meaning of data for factual information translates into
the correlation between knowable and known contents.9
The notion of functional information is pivotal for epistemic (non-realistic)
approaches to knowledge, where it is crucial to dispose of a framework in which
the notion of verification is conceptually prior to – and foundational for – that
of truth.10 In the present paper, we address the analysis of upgrading infor-
mation to knowledge from this latter epistemic perspective, starting from the
ground notion of functional information characterized by locality. We shall rely
on the epistemic constructive definition of information (ECDI) introduced in
[Primiero, 2007] to supervene the alethic/non-alethic issue about informational
contents, relying on the formal framework which uses the theory of judgements
of Martin-Lo¨f’s Type Theory.11
We define functional informational contents as syntactically correct and
meaningful propositional contents. These are not – unlike truth-makers – hold-
ers of a positive alethic value, as they can in turn be negatively characterized
(i.e. they admit refutation); but they cannot be taken independently of their
alethic characterization either, as they would not act as (valuable) factual
information, rather just be discarded as useless – though epistemically admis-
sible – material. Functional Infons are ascriptions of truth to propositional
contents, contents assumed to be true functionally to a certain epistemic state
being formulated. Only the latter is truthfully characterized and qualifies as
being composed by Semantic Infons. This briefly expresses the functional or
operational view on information in the constructive context in which ECDI is
formulated. This theory identifies information with assertion conditions in the
context of a constructive theory of truth for which the Verificationist Principle
of Truth holds:
VPT Truth is defined by the formulation of a verification.
This is a well-behaving schema in the constructivist process of accounting
knowledge and truth. We want to provide a full explanation of this epistemo-
logical principle with respect to the notion of functional information and to
explain the process of upgrading the latter to semantic information. To clarify
the distinction, let us start with an example:
A: “The use of a locker at the library requires a 5p coin”.
This proposition survives a constructive test if and only if a verification pro-
cedure is performed: if I check/have checked that a 5p coin is indeed what I
need to use the lockers at the library, then the claim is true.12 A verification
is then what allows me to infer that
9 As it will appear evident below with the formulation of the Verificationist Principle of
Truth, we are siding here with an anti-realist reading of the truth-functionality of informa-
tion.
10 For a theory that fully integrates a constructivist approach to knowledge with the al-
ready mentioned NTA, see [Floridi, 2011b].
11 See [Martin-Lo¨f, 1984], [Martin-Lo¨f, 1987], [Martin-Lo¨f, 1996].
12 Notice that the process of verification and validation required in the account of truth
as correctness by Floridi plays a very similar role. See [Floridi, 2011, pp.193–195].
5B: “It is true that using a locker at the libray requires a 5p coin (because
so has been checked out)”
and for the epistemic definition of truth, using the definition of information
that is endorsed by DEF
C: “I am informed that the use of a locker at the libray requires a 5p
coin”.
Let us now consider the less evident meaning explanation of the same
sentence, where functional (not necessarily truthful) information takes the
place of true meaningful data:
C ′: “I receive the information that the use of a locker at the libray
requires a 5p coin.”
C ′ can be easily reformulated in instructional terms: “Insert a 5p coin to use
the locker at the library”; or in conditional terms: “If you want to use a locker
at the library, you need to to insert a 5p coin”. It seems that the only evident
way to account for the meaning of this sentence in the context of a functional
notion of information is to start from a weakening of the inference from A to B.
As truth is given by verification, the obvious step is to find the corresponding
logical notion that weakens the verification process.13 Assumptions can be
used in this role:
A′: “The use of a locker at the libray requires a 5p coin”.
B′: “Assume it is true that the use of a locker at the libray requires a
5p coin”.
C ′: “I receive the information that the use a locker at the libray requires
a 5p coin”.
B′ is clearly a necessary condition for the formulation of C ′, whereas its truth is
not. To explain B′ is sufficient to say that a verification is missing, but nonethe-
less admissible: I never was at the library or – to say the least – I never used
the lockers before, but it is not immediately evident that the requirement of a
5p coin is false: it is an epistemically meaningful content, acceptable against
13 ECDI is located by definition on the side of epistemic theories of meaning, endorsing
an understanding of meaning and truth in terms of verification. This costructionist ap-
proach is to be traced back to the work of Dummett, see in particular [Dummett, 1978] and
[Dummett, 1991]. In the Dummettian tradition, when truth is taken to be weakly central
to the meaning-theory, then knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is equated with knowl-
edge of its truth-conditions, but in addition some further explanation is required, consisting
of the ability of laying down the assertion conditions for that sentence. In particular, to
understand a mathematical formula, it is necessary to be able to distinguish between math-
ematical constructions which do and which do not constitute proofs of it. Notoriously, this
extends easily to a theory of meaning as use in the Wittgensteinean tradition. As the next
following lines of this introduction are meant to show, ECDI builds on this basis allowing
for distinct levels of justification, in order to account for the various modes in which asser-
tions present truths. In particular, our approach is founded on a logical theory of forms of
judgements which allows to avoid the collapse into a pragmatic approach to meaning, as a
theory of successfull assertions of truth.
6the agent’s actual knowledge state. A′ becomes what is known in the philo-
sophical literature inspired by Constructivism as a judgement-candidate. C ′
formulates this epistemic state which holds under condition of such unverified
but admissible content. Notice that we have modified the use of the informa-
tional content from a statal state (“I am informed“) to a dynamic processual
state (“I receive the information“). In turn, the inference from C ′ to C relies
obviously on the reduction of admissibility to verification:
D: “I receive the information that the use of a locker at the libray
requires a 5p coin. If that is true (provided I verify that to be the case)
I am informed that the use of a locker requires a 5p coin at the library
and I can use it (e.g. because I have one such coin in my pocket)”.
The epistemic state resulting from this notion of information is not a dif-
ferent notion from the one satisfying DEF, but rather a partial, dynamic
representation of it. It misses the property of being veridical, but it works
in the setting of verified data. We shall refer to it as the epistemic state of
Functional Information, A′ representing a functional infon.
It seems essential now to compare Functional Information with the up-
grade operation to knowledge. The problem will be tackled from the per-
spectivist epistemology that is shown to underlie Martin-Lo¨f’s Type Theory
in [Schaar, v.d. 2009]. We will show how the additional property of data lo-
calization is necessary in the process of explaining upgrading for functional
information.
In the following, we shall organize our arguments as follows: in section 2,
a brief survey of the network theory of account is provided, focusing on the
main critique towards the tripartite definition of knowledge and how that af-
fects our epistemic definition of information; in section 3 we shall recast the
framework of ECDI to gain a common ground with the semantic definition
of information and show the modal extension of our framework which results
crucial for the upgrade issue; in section 4 we finally tackle the upgrade issue
from the perspective of our extended ECDI, namely by focusing on the dis-
tributed on-line nature of data that compose an upgraded information state
and draw the connection to new epistemic phenomena.
2 NTA and the De-coupling Test
The Network Theory of Account (NTA) presented in [Floridi, 2010] is devel-
oped for a notion of semantic information considering non-reflective, opaque
and aleatoric data. Non-reflective data require that holding the information
that p, does not necessarily mean to understand p: an agent holding coded
information p for which she is missing the decrypting key will not be able to
understand p. Opaque and aleatoric data are considered in view of their effect
on knowledge states: epistemic luck affects knowledge, but not information,
and it cannot survive tests, namely questions concerning the information pack-
ets that are constituent of our (possibly lucky) knowledge state. The aleatoric
7state of information is a symptom of the fact that information packets miss
connecting links among each other and so they are mutually independent.
Semantic information lacks the necessary structure of relations that permit
each informational packet to account for another. Hence, upgrading consists
in fulfilling the erotetic deficit intrinsic to data building an information state.
A rather crucial point is the de-coupling problem. The basis of the network
structure is given by the relation between a source s and a sink t which binds
the accounted content and the network itself: in order for a network to be able
to account for a certain fact, it has to provide all the needed answers and its
content has to be no smaller than what allowed by the network’s capacity.
This property, formally corresponding to the calculation of the maximum flow
in a network, satisfies the apparently trivial observation that an explanation
of p is correct if and only if it applies correctly to p. This can be reformulated
as the De-coupling Test :
DcT Explanans and Explanandum cannot be de-coupled without making the
explanation incorrect.
NTA survives the de-coupling test trivially, because the theory of accounting
is monotonic and if an account A of s is correct, then s correctly accounts for
t in A and they cannot be de-coupled. The corresponding sufficient condition
says that the account theory survives a formulation of the Gettier-problem.
Notoriously, Gettierization arises for the tripartite definition of knowledge as
‘true justified belief’ precisely in view of the fact that it is in principle always
possible to de-couple two of the three elements in that definition, namely the
truth of p and the reasons that justify an agent a in holding p true.14
Gettierization represents therefore the first obstacle to any theory of infor-
mation located in the larger context of a theory of knowledge, and in particular
for any account of the upgrade operation. In the case of an epistemic account
of functional information, this is actually a reversible problem that we formu-
late as follows: to show that Gettier-problems are ineffective in the context
of the Verificationist Principle of Truth (VPT), represents enough of a proof
that an epistemic account of information passes the test of de-coupling and so
it satisfies necessary conditions for the sought operation of upgrade.
2.1 Gettierization vs. Perspectivism
The analysis of Gettier-problems from an agent-based perspectivist episte-
mology has been recently formulated in [Schaar, v.d. 2009]. The well-known
phenomenon of Gettierization involves the tripartite definition of knowledge
as ‘justified true belief’, as one can easily imagine cases of true and justified
belief that are not knowledge. This happens, in particular, when one uses the
content of a knowledge state without the ability of accounting for its justi-
fication, as it is the case when one uses or recalls someone’s knowledge (or
14 See [Floridi, 2004b].
8one’s own knowledge in a distinct and not directly reconstructible situation).
The constructivist, first-person perspective epistemology has an easy and very
valuable solution to such cases: Gettier cases are generated by shifting from
the perspective of the subject to that of the attributer; the latter knows the
truth of the content from a completely different perspective than that of the
subject. From a first-person perspective theory of knowledge, one cannot adopt
two perspectives at the same time, hence Gettier cases cannot be formulated.15
The prespectivist epistemology is based on the formulation of contextual
judgements offered in the constructivist vein of Type Theory. Judgements are
the basic elements of the language: a judgement J is the predication of truth
for a propositional content A, hence representing an higher-order format than
classical propositional logic (it is actually as expressive as Intuitionistic FOL):
J = A true.
Judgements are formulated on the basis of syntactic justifications, showing a
construction or proof object a for the content A which makes it possible to
state that A is true:
a :A
J = A true.
In this case, the justification a can be categorical or analytical, i.e. when it
needs no further conditions than what expressed in a itself. Such a justification
would be the one appropriate for a judgement that requires only analytical
skills in order to be understood. Otherwise, the justification can be dependent
from a context of conditions needed for asserting a. These external conditions
are what makes it possible to formulate the relevant justification. Formally,
for any proposition A which is declared true, an appropriate verification a
will be valid on the basis of a number of propositions A1, . . . , An; for each
of such proposition Ai, an appropriate verification xi is assumed. Each such
assumption xi will need to be verified (formally, β-reduced to a corresponding
proof-term ai) in order to prove a :A and so to assert A true:
[x1/a1] :A1, . . . , [xn/an] :An
a :A
The epistemic conditions Γ = {[x1/a1] :A1, . . . , [xn/an] :An} whose veri-
fications make a certain proposition A true, formulate the perspective under
which an agent knows A. To have a ‘justified true belief’ means to be able
to formulate the context in which A holds true, which in turn requires the
formulation of appropriate verification of its assertion conditions. In the per-
spectivist epistemology, such a context will contain all the conditions that the
agent holding the justified true belief needs to satisfy in order to perform such
15 [Schaar, v.d. 2009, p.24]. The same reasoning obviously applies when subject and at-
tributer are the same individual, only accounted from two distinct perspectives, either in
time, space or any other coordinate.
9an epistemic act. To simply hold such a belief without justification (as it hap-
pens e.g. when someone is referring someonelse’s belief) means to empty the
context under which the true belief holds, in turn trivializing the correspond-
ing knowledge state. In other words, under the constructivist/perspectivist
epistemology, it is impossible to claim to have justified true belief outside of
the scope of the formulation of an appropriate context.
Under this reformulation, VPT is more precisely reformulated as its con-
textual counterpart:
cVPT Truth is defined by the exhibition of a verification under the explicit
satisfaction of its context of conditions.
Shifting from one subject to another (or to the same subject in a different
situation) requires switching from one context of conditions to a new one, hence
formulating a new perspective under which the validity of A is questioned. In
particular, for any two equivalent propositions A ≡ B, equivalent constructions
or justifications are required and general formal rules of identity hold both
at the level of constructions and propositions, which corresponds formally to
defining α-rules on terms. This notion of identity satisfies standard definitional
and equality properties.
Contextually justified judgements and their identity conditions are crucial
to show that functional information passes the de-coupling test. We recast a
contextually derived judgement J as a semantic infon; the functional infons on
which J is based are given by the related set of conditions for J formulated in
context Γ . This leads to a variant definition of cVPT in terms of information:
Definition 1 (Functional Principle of Semantic Information) Seman-
tic Information is defined by the explicit satisfaction of its Functional Infons.
To see how this principle applies, let us return to our example from the previous
section:
Γ =“I receive the information that the use of a locker at the libray
requires a 5p coin.
[xi/a] : Ai for every Ai ∈ Γ = verify that the use of a locker at the
libray requires a 5p coin.
J = (as Γ is verified) I am informed that the use of a locker at the
library requires a 5p coin (and I can use it, e.g. because I have one such
coin in my pocket)”
The set of functional infons in Γ formulates the conditions under which J
is formulated, Γ ` J . Identical claims need to have identical (or reducible)
conditions, Γ ` J, Γ ′ ` J ′, J ≡ J ′ ⇒ Γ ≡ Γ ′; non-reducible contexts provide
different conditions, thus leading to non reducible semantic infons. The ob-
taining of the claim in J is constrained to the satisfaction of its conditions,
[xi/ai] : Ai,∀Ai ∈ Γ , which generates a user-based – but not relativistic –
10
perspective. Notice that J is closed under logical consequence, whereas Γ is
not.
The non-relativistic nature of the formal approach here endorsed is, of
course, crucial. The verificationist approach, equipped with definitional equal-
ity (reflexive, symmetric, transitive) ensures that this (perspectivist) notion
of truth is actually based on a normalized notion of justification. This means
that two equivalent propositions A and A′ will have correspondingly equivalent
justifications a and a′, whose formal identity is provable, i.e. either one will
be the normal form of the other, or it exists a third justification a′′ to which
both a and a′ reduce. It is therefore not admissible for a subject to assert
the truth of A without relying on a justification a which is in turn reducible
to the corresponding normal form. The contextual nature of our justifications
allows nonetheless such a term to assume different forms and in particular to
have appropriate set of assertion conditions, whose unique requirement is the
reducibility to corresponding terms.
For the definition of functional information Gettierization is avoided in
the same terms as it is for the perspectivist epistemology, namely because
functional infons constitute the set of conditions for certain true contents to
hold. As explained above, formulating a believed content means to formulate
the corresponding justification; in order to formulate and correctly assert the
latter, appropriate assertion conditions will be required. Hence, semantic infons
are coupled to the relevant set of functional infons. So the De-coupling Test is
passed in the following form:
Info-DcT Functional Infons and Semantic Infons cannot be de-coupled with-
out making the informational state incorrect.
A factual semantic notion of information has a corresponding functional
counterpart that endorses a verification procedure. It remains to be seen how
our formal framework deals with the distinction between true sentences (se-
mantic information) and their conditions (functional information) without col-
lapsing admissible contents and verified data, in order to preserve the distinc-
tion between truthful data and meaningful but untrue data, i.e. misinforma-
tion.
2.2 Data for Functional Information
The admissibility of refutable truths is a sensible topic for verificationist theo-
ries of truth. For the standard intuitionistic meaning explanation of negation,
indirect proofs as reductio ad absurdum are standardly not admitted, whereas
the usual intuitionistic absurdity rule interprets the classical ex falso quodli-
bet.16 The foundational idea that truth can be explained also as admissible
up to a counter-example was already at the basis of the notion of ‘pseudo-
truth’ introduced in [Kolmogorov, 1925] for double-negated classical formulas
16 See e.g. [Troelstra, Dalen, v., 1988, p. 40].
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reducible to intuitionistic ones. The problem arises with the standard way
of defining assumptions in the constructivist vein. Such definition does not
coincide with the notion of assumption as refutable truth needed to define
functional information as ‘possibly false content’ (i.e. the core of the notion of
information that does not satisfy VT): it is instead considered as a process of
forgetting the relevant content contained in a (in principle already obtained)
construction.17 In the present setting, admissible truths should be literally
satisfied by the logical concept of assumption, a computational term which is
still possibly refuted.
To obtain such interpretation we need to introduce the analysis of meaning
within the formal framework at hand. Thereby we shall characterize functional
information in terms of non-reflective, opaque and aleathoric data. As a result
of admitting the desired notion of assumption as refutable data, the formal
framework is transformed in a related constructive modal type system requir-
ing polymorphism in order to introduce variable and proof constructors as
distinct terms, in particular the former becoming an admissible term in view
of a missing refutation.18
Let us hence start with a very short presentation of the standard construc-
tion rules for judgements with proof terms and variables. In type theories,
getting the right type structure also establishes correctness for the system,
in particular by the introduction rules for types and connectives that build
non-atomic formulas and by the proofs-as-programs identity defining modu-
lar programs.19 To understand the typing procedure, we need to explain the
distinction between typing and meaning. Typing an object involves meaning
declaration at two distinct levels. As an example, consider the declaration of
the value of a certain variable to range on the set of natural numbers; con-
structively, this requires the definition of the type itself (the natural numbers)
by axiomatic construction of its elements:
N : set; 0 : N; a : N
s(a) : N.
It is on the basis of such typing rules that the use of assumptions becomes
admissible, for example in a λ-abstraction rule:
a : N b : N(x : N)
((x)b)(a) = b[a/x] : N[a/x].
Hence, at the first level of typing, one is considering the evaluation of the
concrete level of meaning, obtained by performing the operation and getting
17 For the so-called ‘Forget-Restore Principle’, see [Sambin, Valentini, 1998].
18 See [Primiero, 2012] for the full formal language: it is a variant interpretation of the basic
system of constructive type-theory that links hypotheses and refutable contents. It extends to
a modal type-theory, variating on a theme first proposed in [Pfenning, Dvies, 2001] and later
expanded in [Nanevski et al., 2008]. We shall here only focus on the appropriate introduction
rules for justified and assumed contents and expand on the use of modalities in the next
section.
19 See [Turner, Eden, 2008] and [Gunter, 1994].
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the value by substitution of bounded variables, as in the expression b[a/x] :
N[a/x]. The level of meaning expressed by the object b coincides with the
predication that it belongs to the type N. A different level of typing is at stake
when considering the role of bounded variables for expression of the form
b : N(x : N), where x is abstracted from a : N, which expresses meaningfulness
for the dependent judgement. At this level, one uses the meaningfulness of
N abstracted from the appropriate constructor (that is, without the related
value), in order to proceed in the construction of a new object.
Hence, meaning and meaningfulness are at two distinct levels of abstraction
within our type-theoretical framework: the latter concerning types and typed
variables, the former concerning typed values.20 Nonetheless, the notion of
assumption involved by the dependent judgement in the second premise of the
rule of λ-abstraction does not really express the idea of refutable content we
are after. It is bounded with respect to the introduced type by the first premise,
where a construction for that object is obtained beforehand and it is not meant
to interpret any refutability on contents. We need instead to interpret such a
dependent judgement as a derivation from an open assumption, i.e. our aim is
to provide an interpretation of meaningfulness independent from evaluation.
This can be formulated in a type system that allows for the following set of
typing rules:
a :A Type Formation
A type
a :A
Truth Definition
A true
a :A
I⊥¬A→ ⊥
¬(A→ ⊥) type
Informational Type Formation
A typeinf
A typeinf x :A
Hypothetical Truth Definition
A true∗
Type Formation preserves strict constructibility of truth, inducing Truth Def-
inition; I⊥ let infer (working in a finitistic setting) non-refutability of an ob-
tained construction; Informational Type Formation is meant to allow admissi-
ble constructions as place-holders for unverified hypothetical truths, expressed
by the weaker true∗ predicate. This set of rules is completed by appropriate
constructors on connectives within type and typeinf . Technically, the crucial
step to make this system going is represented by separate implications: a ma-
terial one for type is obtained by using application of obtained constructions,
whereas the one for typeinf instantiates functional abstraction:
20 For more on abstraction in this context, see [Primiero, 2009].
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a :A A true b :B
I →
a(b) :A→ B
A typeinf b :B[x :A]
Functional abstraction
((x)b) :A ⊃ B true
Moreover, the type fragment includes quantifiers acting only over finite sets
of constructors,
a1 :A, . . . , an :A A true ` b :B λ((ai(b))A,B)
I∀
(∀ai :A)B type
Ai true→ b :B (< ai, b >,A,B)
I∃
(∃ai :A)B type
whereas conversion rules are defined over terms of the typeinf fragment.
A typeinf b :B[x :A] a :A
β-conversion
(x(b))(a) = b[a/x] :B type[a/x]
λ((a1−i(b))A,B) (b)[ai := a]
α-conversion
(ai(b)) :A→ B
For both fragments structural rules are definable.21
This notion of assumption can be used to express data for functional infor-
mation: it admits meaningfulness but not truth; verification is the operation
that turns it into satisfied conditions, in turn actualizing justification for the
propositional content at hand; the latter will then be factual, semantic infor-
mation by adding truthfulness; refutation is the corresponding construction
operation for revealing misinformation. Data in this language are syntacti-
cally construed, correctness being revealed at this level by appropriate typing
rules. The kind of typeinf expressions also preserves the semantic aspect but
they miss explicit typing at level of value formation, which can be given in the
formal language by the β-conversion rule from above. This makes its content
non-reflective.
When we address the notion of functional information, in the form “Let
x be of type A and y be of type B, then (x)y is of type A → B”, we are
giving functional meaningfulness via type declarations; no data value, i.e. out-
put evaluation is performed at this stage, hence information involving types
A,B does not contain enough data to understand the value associated with
A → B. The typing value of the operation A → B implements the structural
information, i.e. it needs not only to be reflectional in terms of evaluation, it
also needs to be transparent in terms of structure. This means that an agent
using the type A → B, or just guessing its value, does not say yet anything
on the result of the corresponding operation (in this case a functional abstrac-
tion). To get it right without an appropriate evaluation process is actually
21 For a complete presentation see [Primiero, 2012].
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only blind (lucky) knowledge. A similar argument can be brought forth in the
case of admitting truths ‘up to refutation’, that is ascribing truth to certain
contents. The set of typing variables gives the meaningfulness of the expres-
sion (message) in terms of functional information, but only data evaluation
and data construction bring the right typing structure as its meaning. This
shows that functional infons – expressed by refutable meaningful data – pre-
serves non-reflective data in terms of the distinction between meaningfulness
and meaning.
A notion of semantic information that relies on the equation ‘structured
meaningfulness + verification’ seems apt to guarantee a minimal degree of
transparency to data. Its functional counterpart (i.e. simply ‘structured mean-
ingfulness’), taken in view of a single epistemic state, is sufficiently transparent
to the agent to allow her to admit its content in view of her present knowl-
edge. Not so when functional infons express the set of conditions that make
true contents possible. Under this reading, functional infons are user generated
and user directed data, which makes them opaque in view of the dynamics of
changing contexts, or opaqueness to external states. When verification is per-
formed on functional infons, the agent acquires an informational state which
can be transmitted over to other states (be they of other agents or of the same
agent). When such communication happens (in the limit case among different
epistemic states of the same agent) without verification, data is transferred in
terms of the admissible epistemic contents in contexts: these are accepted as
opaque data. In this sense, information is collectively opaque and non-reflective.
Definition 2 (Functional Information) Functional Information is syntac-
tically well-formed, meaningful, non-reflective, collectively opaque data.
It is our aim to explain in the next section how such global opaqueness
for semantic information turns into global transparency for knowledge con-
tents. We maintain this to be the reason why verification does not account per
se for the epistemic operation of upgrade, which instead requires a transpar-
ent analysis of the message structure for any possible communication chain.
By addressing this latter point, we shall show what actually is upgrade from
functional information to knowledge.
3 Going to a higher level of representation: data access
Contexts of our epistemic language express the network in which functional
information can be justified. As mentioned earlier, the dynamics of context-
switching can be defined over distinct epistemic states of a single agent, or
rather over epistemic states of distinct agents. In the limit case, a single context
is the composition of multiple contexts each intended as a singleton indexed for
a different agent. The notion of verification for epistemic data valid in contexts
is based on the definition of conditions for knowledge and their reducibility to
equal contexts.
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The definition of appropriate equivalence functions on possibly false data
has to preserve their origin and validity location: truthfulness becomes depen-
dent on the possible extension of the original context of assertion conditions
to other distinct contexts. This requirement can be formulated by determin-
ing limits on the network: whereas for the upgrade of the notion of semantic
information a necessary requirement is that information on the channel is not
less than its capability, as to ensure that no necessary data is missing;22 when
starting from the lower functional level, one also has to know that the net-
work capability is no greater than the amount of valid information needed.
In other words, one needs to establish how to access data and where such
data is still valid by knowing which accessible context falsifies it, turning it
into misinformation. Let us call this the Data Accessibility Problem. To refor-
mulate the identity issue raised in the previous section within the model of
functional information we are proposing, means therefore to solve the Data
Accessibility Problem. The language needs now additional expressiveness in
order to refer to meta-properties for the data in the network, in particular
for their validity-preserving accessibility relations. An epistemic definition of
modalities is the obvious enrichment of the language to obtain this further
level of expressiveness.
3.1 Epistemic Modalities
The notion of epistemic modality has received an increasing attention in the
literature during the last decade. The original debate on the definition of
epistemic modality as an operator defining truth conditionally on an epistemic
state would focus on the explanation of sentences such as “It is possible that P”
or “It is necessary that P” (with P a proposition) on the basis of a clarification
of related truth conditions, dependently from the epistemic state of the speaker
or other.23 A different account of the notion of epistemic modality is given in
those approaches where one gets rid of truth conditions entirely and defines
appropriate counterparts of the standard notions of necessity and possibility
by referring to validity of alternative (accessible) assertion conditions.24 The
analysis put forward in [Primiero, 2009b] offers precisely the kind of machinery
needed.
One starts by defining judgemental modalities in terms of appropriate as-
sertion conditions for the propositional content involved. Provided that truth
is reduced to satisfied conditions for having the right to express a judgement,
necessity for a judgement-candidate corresponds to satisfaction of all condi-
tions in all states: such a judgement expresses a known truth, which cannot be
known to be otherwise. Provided the constructive interpretation that identifies
22 As explained in the context of NTA, cf. [Floridi, 2010].
23 Standard references for this debate are e.g. [De Rose, 1991] [McFarlan, 2005],
[Egan, 2007] and [Dietz, 2008].
24 Such formal analyses (and applications thereof) are given for example in [Kahle, 2006],
[Pfenning, Dvies, 2001], [Murphy, 2008], [Primiero, 2009b] and [Kahle, 2012].
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provability, truth and knowledge (that a proposition A is true means that a
proof for A is known), necessity for (A true) says:25
“A is true” is necessary ⇒ “A is true” is known
(A true)⇒ K(A true).
Here K can be seen as a knowledge-operator, in the style of epistemic logics, or
as an explicit operator for a (group of) knowing agent(s). When A presupposes
further propositions to be known, these represent the context in which A is
known to be true, Γ = (A1 true, . . . , An true). The reading of (A true) is
formulated as knowledge for which no further contextual conditions are needed
(Γ = ∅):
“A is true” is necessary ⇔ Agent K knows that A, for any knowledge
state agent K is in
(A true)⇔ K((∅)A true).
Eventually, this amounts to say that A true is valid under any possible Γ ,
as by definition assumptions in Γ cannot formulate conditions contradicting
an already expressed construction. Model-theoretical necessity as truth in all
possible worlds corresponds directly to the proof-theoretical verification under
no specific assertion-conditions, hence under all possible ones.
The corresponding interpretation of a judgemental possibility operator can
now be provided. Contextual knowledge amounts to the formulation of satis-
fiable conditions:
“A is true” is possible ⇔ Agent K knows that A, for some knowledge
state Γ agent K is in
♦(A true)⇒ K((Γ )A true).
Only with Γ empty this formula reduces to the conditions for (A true).
Otherwise, it means that truth is preserved under some knowledge states in
which the agent is able to satisfy appropriate conditions, hence only some
extension ∆ of Γ will be preserving with respect to the validity of A true.
Under this reading, necessity is reflected as actual knowledge in the follow-
ing syntactic representation (where J is the judgement stating “A is true” and
Γ a set of assumptions xn : An):
26
Γ ` J -RuleΓ ` J
25 Notice here the properly judgemental nature of our modalities, as we let them range
over judgements rather than over propositions in the form (A true). The latter is
the form of judgements used for the modal extension of Martin-Lo¨f’s Type Theory in
[Pfenning, Dvies, 2001] and [Nanevski et al., 2008], whereas we use the judgemental modal-
ities both in [Primiero, 2012] and [Primiero, 2010] in order to express the contextual nature
of our proof-terms.
26 See also [Bellin et al., 2001] for a formal language that requires the same kind of rules.
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By this rule, one accounts for judgements whose conditions have been verified,
therefore allowing provability of the conclusion.
The extension that preserves refutable assumptions, inducing possibility
on the conclusion, is given as follows (as in the previous rule, J stands for a
formula of the form A true):
Γ, J1 ` J2 ♦-RuleΓ,♦J1 ` ♦J2
This reading extends the previous interpretation of necessity as proof-conditions
to the assertion conditions of hypothetical judgements, preserving the formu-
lation of knowledge contents epistemically weaker than strictly proved ones.
To express data accessibility, one needs to modify modal contexts so ob-
tained in view of multi-modalities to distinguish different information sources
(or different states of the same source). Multi-modalities can be introduced
in terms of a context extension operation. We say that a type A is true in a
context Γ | ∆ (Γ extended by ∆) if the judgement J = A true is justified
by ai : A in context Γ , i.e. its construction contains all satisfied conditions
in Γ and it remains valid under any extension Γ | ∆; then A is said to be
globally valid under Γ | ∆; otherwise, the judgement J is justified by xi : A
in context Γ , i.e. its construction depends on open variables in Γ or in some
extension Γ | ∆; then A is said to be locally valid under Γ | ∆. The context
extension operation allows to mimic syntactically the notion of accessibility
so that judgemental modal operators express that a proof holds somewhere
or everywhere, with respect to contexts.27 A signed (modal) context ◦Γi can
now be extended in view of a differently signed (modal) context ◦∆j (where
◦ = {,♦}). A re-definition of modal judgements is now possible in view of
the derivability from multi-modal contexts:
– k(A true) iff for all Γj ∈ Context, ∅ | jΓ ` i(A true), where j =⋃{1, . . . , i− 1} ∈ G;
– ♦k(A true) iff for some Γi, ∆j ∈ Context, iΓ | ♦j∆ ` ♦k(A true), where
j =
⋃{1, . . . , k − 1} ∈ G;
The meaning of the epistemic state derivable from a modal context is dictated
by the modalities constraining the relevant contexts. A multi-modal context
Σi,j is a context extension (in the following ΣG will abbreviate Σi,j)
◦iΓ | ◦j∆ = {◦i(A true), . . . , ◦i(N true), ◦j(O true)};
On the one hand, following the ♦-Rule, the type-theoretical expression
♦GΣ ` ♦J is obtained by iΓ | ♦j∆ ` ♦J and expresses the local validity of
27 Our distinction between terms and modal operators is technically the same distinction
obtained in [Moody, 2003] by distinguishing between variables for different kind of hypothe-
ses and labels to refer to locations of such constructors. The complete formal analysis of
the properties of the extension to multi-modalities in connection to distributed computing is
presented in [Primiero, 2010]. See also [Primiero, Taddeo, 2011] for the use of this framework
to formalize communications characterized by trust.
18
J from source i and j in view of the information that source j makes available
when accessed from source i and which can be lost when accessing source k:
the epistemic state expressed by J = A true is obtained by the knowledge
distributed over the network G at point i, using additional data accessible at
point j and not everywhere else. Accessibility of the data at j is necessary to
the formulation of J and some k > j > i ∈ G can refute J .
On the other hand, following the -Rule, GΣ ` J is obtained by iΓ |
j∆ ` J and it expresses the global validity of J from source i and j, in view
of the information that source j makes available when accessed from source
i and which persists when accessing any other source k: the epistemic state
expressed by J = A true is obtained by the knowledge common to the network
G at point i, using data accessible to any agent at point j: accessibility of the
data at j is crucial to the formulation of J because necessary and irrefutable
at any other k ∈ G.
4 Epistemic upgrade: putting online distributed data
The final step of our argumentation is at this stage easily discovered. We
present the structure of the upgrade operation as a tripartite one:
1. from locally indexed data one extracts functional information, i.e. data
that is strictly linked to a source and that can be falsified by adding new
sources to the relevant network;
2. evaluation of local data turns content based on it into semantic information,
i.e. with the additional property of considering distributed data as true with
respect to the relevant network;
3. assessing that evaluation of local data can be preserved under any extension
of the relevant network corresponds to make data true for any possible peer
outside of the given network, and thus upgrading semantic information into
knowledge.
The crucial aspect of the first of these steps is to consider data not as
genetically neutral, rather specified from a given origin, always embedded (or
embeddable) in a network. This data is refutable and hence serves only a
functional role; it is localized and must be admissible within the network: this
makes it structured meaningful but opaque data.
The operation of admitting its truth within the boundaries of a given net-
work makes such content appropriate to justify data and thus to constitute a
state of semantical information, which remains collectively opaque, in princi-
ple still refutable when a possible extension of the given network is taken into
account.
The machinery of modalities adds the possibility of expressing the distinc-
tion between validity under network boundaries or under any extension of the
originating epistemic state: this means to formulate verification at further lo-
calities outside of the network. This latter step defines properly the upgrade
operation from semantic information to knowledge, as any context extension
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can simulate the process of accounting for one or more embeddings (equivalent
to HC-questions). The everywhere vs. somewhere dichotomy that is crucial to
express data validity receives in this way a finer and precise representation.
Definition 3 (Oﬄine data) Data is in off-line status when it is not validly
accessed by any admissible network source.
In the modal setting, this is equivalent to a propositional content that is satis-
fied in some possible epistemic context, making its conditions still refutable at
some additional point extending the network. This means one cannot exclude
there is a point whose access will break the network validity with respect to
the content at hand. This definition satisfies trivially the notion of functional
information. But it also satisfies the notion of semantic information as collec-
tively opaque data, i.e. when well-formed, meaningful and veridical data in
one context is transmitted over to some other epistemic context. For this we
formulate derivability from ♦GΣ as inferring possibility judgements:
Γi | xj :A ` B true∗
multiple I♦♦GΣ ` ♦i,j(B true)
which is an instance of substitution of declarations for contexts with modal
assumptions: by extending the (either global or local) assumptions of Γi with
information accessible locally at source j, the judgement (B true) is prefixed
by ♦i,j , meaning these sources are always to be called upon for the validity
of B (i.e. holds at their intersection). The multiplicity condition means that
equivalent operations need to be performed within Γi, ∆j where necessary.
On the other hand, we need to account for verification of structured mean-
ings preserved across distinct epistemic states:
Definition 4 (Online data) Data is in on-line status when is validly acces-
sible by any admissible network source.
In the modal setting this is equivalent to a propositional content satisfied
in a necessitated epistemic context, when all conditions for that content are
satisfied and they remain so at any additional point considered extending the
network. We hence rely on the basic property by which i(A true) is derivable
from ∅ | nΓ and hence Γn | ∆n is admissible for any ∆. This definition
implies the validity of (A true) at any point in G, which establishes modal
derivability under verification. The appropriate formal rule to implement this
is the following:
Γi | xj :A ` A true∗ iΓ, [xj/aj ] :A ` A true
multiple IGΣ ` G(A true)
which explains how to turn local validity into global validity, by termination
on each assertion condition. The multiplicity condition applies to ensure that
the rule be applied on any distinct instance within Γ and by any admissible
extension.
The definition of the upgrade operation is embedded into that of online
data.
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Definition 5 (Upgrade) A content is upgraded from information to knowl-
edge when it consists of verified online data.
Messaging among points in the network corresponds to validity checking under
different contexts, each such context expressing at least one of the necessary
conditions for the content at hand. Such notion of knowledge is by defini-
tion irrefutable true content, because validly acceptable by any extension of
the originating network and so it refutes any form of Gettierization. Its con-
tent as online data expresses accessibility to/from any point of any accessible
network and formally corresponds to validity under any extension of the gen-
erating epistemic state. Oﬄine data can be equated to data valid according
to some privileged point in the network, generated and possibly accepted at
more points of the original network, but not yet submitted to the validity of
any possible extension of the network.28
Our final thesis is that epistemic data in a distributed network is crucially
(functional/semantic) information: when a content (either true or still falsi-
fiable) is not accessible by at least one point of a given network, it cannot
be qualified as knowledge. Under this reading, distributed knowledge can be
accounted as ‘knowledge’ only in view of the external perspective that collects
all the different points of the network involved: from the internal viewpoint
of the network, this content cannot be accounted as knowledge by each point.
Necessitated data is the result of the proper upgrading from information to
knowledge (i.e. the switch from distributed to common data): it is content
that becomes accessible by any point of the network, with additional proper-
ties available such as overload (more than one point in the network is able to
provide a given content, literally each point is able to provide any content)
and iteration (every point in the network is able to identify itself as bearer
of a given content). Notice that in this setting the notion of information is a
more fundamental notion, whereas the notion of knowledge is induced.
4.1 Misinformation does not survive online
An additional argument to show that knowledge is correctly defined as seman-
tic information turned online by the actual access of any peer in each possible
extension of the original network, is given by showing that what goes online
cannot be misinformation. This needs to be further specified to avoid misun-
derstandings. It is not the case that every item of information flowing in a
network is true. Rather, if something is defined as online data, it is put to the
test of being accessible (checked) from any peer in any possible extension of the
originating network. Accordingly, to show data to be misinformation means
to have a network extension Γi | ∆j by which functional information xi :A is
extended by semantic data A→ ⊥. This means to establish the validity of the
semantic content of A to hold up to extension of the network to point j. In
28 See [Primiero, Taddeo, 2011] for the formal details concerning equivalence with common
and distributed knowledge.
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turn, whereas the inference from ♦iΣ to ♦i(A true) is possible, by extension
to ∆j there is no reduction possible to j(A true). In other words, if the net-
work of knowledge is considered included j, refutation of A can be determined
and therefore the functional data A can be rejected from the network. Up to
granting access to j, A can still be taken functionally in the context of network
Γi, eventually accepted as true.
An easy way to see this principle applied, is to consider the level of reliabil-
ity of mass information retrieval systems as the Internet, in particular in the
form of open encyclopedias. A notorious case is the reliability of Wikipedia,
which crucially relies on “how quickly false or misleading information is re-
moved”.29 The principle that misinformation does not survive online instan-
tiates precisely the virtuous circle that collaborative structures as Wikipedia
implement for open contents. Extension via contextual accessibility of the net-
work simulates the practice of revision of an entry by peers: our indexes over
constructors correspond to locations for contributors. A given content (e.g. a
Wikipedia entry) is admissible as semantic information (true) only if all false
contents in it have been removed, and addressed as functional information
(falsifiable content) if it exists (in principle) at least one new peer which can
edit the entry by removing or altering any false claim it contains: when this
latter condition can no longer be satisfied, that is when whoever access the
entry would not be able to provide a falsification for (part of) its content, the
entry becomes globally valid, hence qualifying as knowledge. Up to the exis-
tence of a possible peer that can falsify a claim in the content of a Wikipedia
entry, its content is locally valid; a content which is (in principle) verified by
any peer accessing the entry, would then be globally valid.
In reality, this process is far less precise, as accessibility can be restricted,
it should be considered in view of expertise and trust principles,30 and contro-
versies can arise on issues that are hard to formalize. Nonetheless, this model
aims at a general representation, as it can be easily applied for example to the
revision of paradigms in science, where the formulation of a new theoretical
model that falsifies older data can be accounted as a network extension on
a pair with other update processes. It also guarantees that the principle of
open revision is maintained up to the highest standard, where the aim is to
preserve any possible contribution. Under this reading, assessing the truth of
data can no longer be based on the reliability that is attributed to the origi-
nating source or network; rather, it is required that truthfulness be assessed
by completing a reviewing process consisting of opening the content to all
the possible peers considered relevant extensions of the originating network.
Only a content surviving such open reviewing of relevant network extensions
becomes a knowledge content.
29 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reliability_of_Wikipedia. See also
[Viegas et al., 2004] and [Besiki et al., 2008] for studies on the practice of work orga-
nization and cooperation in online encyclopedias.
30 For the implementation of trust relations over communications in the form of contextual
judgements, see the already mentioned [Primiero, Taddeo, 2011].
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, our first concern was to highlight the fundamental role of the
notion of functional information in the formal epistemology of information
theories. Functional information fulfills the weaker role in the epistemic family
of concepts including semantic information and knowledge: with respect to the
companion semantic notion it lacks the alethic characterization, with respect
to knowledge it lacks verifiability at any point of the network it flows in.
Its importance is, in the first place, given by the need for resolving the de-
bate concerning the Veridicality Thesis: functional information is typically the
notion of information that grounds semantic information and that still admits
the possibility of turning into misinformation. In the second place, functional
information shows that epistemic theories of truth are needed in the context of
formal theories of information, as they encapsulate the most needed notions of
verification and falsification as a medium to distinguish between information
and misinformation. We have shown how this happens without our theory
of functional information being affected by basic problems such as Decou-
pling (from semantic information) and Gettierization (of the related notion of
knowledge). Data for functional information share with semantic information
syntactical correctness and meaningfulness, but obviously not truthfulness.
Moreover, their opaqueness is contextual, as they are the medium of commu-
nication among distinct epistemic state. This has led us to an analysis of data
location and accessibility, for which epistemic modalities have been used. As
a result, the distinction between information and knowledge and the bridg-
ing operation of upgrade have been identified via the multiple accessibility of
data among admissible networks, providing intuitive epistemic definitions for
online and oﬄine data, relevant in view of contemporary forms of knowledge
acquisition processes.
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